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the opinion of Justice Holmes, delivered fifty years ago in Buck v. Bell. Until
the Supreme Court again rules on such a law, the legal controversy surround-
ing compulsory sterilization will undoubtedly continue.
Storrow A. Moss
The Constitution Does Not Protect an Individual
from Being Labelled a Criminal
Defendants, police chiefs in Louisville and Jefferson County, Kentucky, in
a cooperative effort produced and delivered a flyer purporting to warn all
local area merchants of "active shoplifters." Plaintiff's name and photograph
appeared on the flyer as a result of his arrest approximately eighteen months
earlier on a charge of shoplifting, which was dismissed shortly after the flyer
was circulated. Plaintiff filed suit in federal district court under the civil rights
statute' seeking damages as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. The
district court dismissed the action, ruling that plaintiff had not been deprived
of any right secured by the United States Constitution. The Sixth Circuit
reversed and held that the plaintiff had alleged facts that constituted a denial
of due process of law. 2 The Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held, reversed:
Interest in reputation is neither "liberty" nor "property" under the four-
teenth amendment and, therefore, is not protected from state deprivation.
Paul v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1976).
I. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS PRESERVED WITHIN THE CONCEPT OF "LIBERTY"
UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Consideration of the scope of "liberty" under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment is paramount when determining the constitutional
protections afforded an individual's good name and privacy in reference to
his arrest record. The confines of "liberty" have been a constant controversy
throughout American legal history. In Allgeyer v. Louisiana3 and Lochner v.
New York' the Supreme Court first expanded the scope of "liberty" beyond
its common law meaning by broadly interpreting "liberty" in the fourteenth
amendment to include the freedom of contract.' Expansion of the concept of
I. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). The statute, promulgated pursuant to the authority vested in
Congress by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5, provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
2. Davis v. Paul, 505 F.2d 1180 (6th Cir. 1974).
3. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
4. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
5. Many had advocated that "liberty" at common law meant only freedom from physical
restraint. See. e.g., Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L.
REv. 431 (1926).
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"liberty" was further developed in Gitlow v. New York,6 in which the Court
determined that the freedoms of speech and press were protected by the
fourteenth amendment. This expansion was dependent upon the willingness
of the Court to establish protections not explicitly stated within the text of the
Constitution.7
Most of the early decisions defining the scope of "liberty" involved the
incorporation controversy: whether the protections contained within the Bill
of Rights are included within the concept of "liberty" under the fourteenth
amendment.8 Mr. Justice Black took the position that including within "lib-
erty" any rights not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution would allow the
judiciary to engage in practices beyond its power. Accordingly, he advocated
that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment was intended to
apply all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights to the states. 9 On the other
hand, Mr. Justice Frankfurter advocated that the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment should protect individuals in accordance with
"canons of decency and fairness."" Under this theory the fourteenth amend-
ment does not necessarily provide all protections of the Bill of Rights, nor
limit protections to those included in the Bill of Rights. Mr. Justice Frankfur-
ter's position was eventually accepted." Thus, Allgeyer as the initiator and
Adamson as the catalyst broadened the scope of "liberty" to include protec-
tions beyond those explicitly stated in the Constitution.
The fundamental fairness doctrine, which resulted in inconsistencies, 2
caused the Court to develop a selective incorporation approach. 3 Although
the Court has followed the path of selective incorporation, it continues to use
the fundamental fairness test to determine which clauses in the Bill of Rights
are included under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
most significant result of this approach has been the development of pro-
tected rights beyond those explicitly stated in the Bill of Rights. For example,
6. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
7. Other broad readings of liberty include Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510(1925),
and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
8. In Barron v. Mayor & City Council, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), the Supreme Court held
that the Bill of Rights was not applicable to the states. With the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment the Supreme Court began incorporating many of the protections of the Bill of Rights
into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, thereby making them applicable to the
states.
9. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
10. 332 U.S. at 67. His position was similar to Mr. Justice Cardozo's opinion in Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), that the due process clause was designed to protect those
interests "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Id. at 325.
II. See, e.g., Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 660 (1948).
12. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). In Wolf the Court found the federal
exclusionary rule which bars the use of evidence secured through an illegal search inapplicable to
the states. Id. at 33. However, in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), the Court found the
rule applicable when the ividence was secured as a result of pumping the defendant's stomach
against his will. Id. at 173. Two years later in Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954), the Court
distinguished Wolf from Rochin, stating that the exclusionary rule was only applicable when
physical coercion was involved. Id. at 133. This distinction, however, proved insufficient since
the Court in Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957), found that the exclusionary rule was not
appropriate for all bodily invasions. Id. at 435-37. The Court's failure to provide a consistent
guide resulted in the adoption of specific protections of the Bill of Rights. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 655 (1961).
13. Some of the many clauses of the Bill of Rights which have been selectively incorporated
into "liberty" within the fourteenth amendment include: the fourth, fifth, and sixth amend-
ments. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I (1964) (fifth amendment); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth amendment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (fourth amendment).
in Roe v. Wade4 the Court's recognition of a constitutionally protected right
without explicit justification in the text of the Bill of Rights was vividly
illustrated. 15 Similarly, in Griswold v. Connecticut16 the Court found a right of
privacy of the marital bedroom, which although not specifically mentioned in
the Bill of Rights, was penumbral to several rights which are mentioned. What
additional rights are protected within the Roeand Griswold analysis remains
uncertain. 17
I1. REPUTATION AND PRIVACY AS PROTECTED BY THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT
Early Supreme Court decisions did not consider whether interest in one's
reputation was a fundamental right protected by the concept of liberty in the
fourteenth amendment. ' 8 In United States v. Lovett,19 however, the Supreme
Court did recognize that stigmatizing an individual may have a serious impact.
The Court again considered the ramifications of harm to reputation in Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath.20 Of the six Justices who
reached the constitutional issue only Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice
Douglas intimated that reputation alone should be afforded due process
protection. 21 Mr. Justice Jackson determined that a member of an organiza-
tion labelled "subversive" may claim a deprivation of constitutional rights on
the grounds that he is ineligible to obtain a government job. 22 The dissenting
Justices clearly felt that harm to one's reputation was not sufficient to invoke
due process protections. -3
The issue of whether reputation alone is to be afforded due process protec-
tions was left open in McGrath. In a series of cases following McGrath the
Court apparently accepted the idea that harm to one's reputation alone would
not invoke due process protections, although never directly confronting this
issue with an unambiguous decision. 24 Against this background the Supreme
14. 410 U.S. 113(1973).
15. See note 32 infra and accompanying text. Other cases have recognized constitutionally
protected rights without explicit justification in the text of the Constitution. See, e.g., Aptheker v.
Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
16. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
17. See notes 28-31 infra and accompanying text.
18. In most of these early cases the Court did not rule on this issue because more concrete
losses were involved, such as the loss of a job, which were sufficient alone to invoke the due
process clause.
19. 328 U.S. 303 (1946). In Lovett congressional legislation attempted permanently to bar
plaintiffs from governmental service, based upon a finding that they were disloyal, without
granting sufficient procedural protections.
20. 341 U.S. 123 (1951). The Attorney General, pursuant to authority given him by an
executive order issued by the President, had labelled the complaining organizations "Commun-
ist" without granting a hearing or giving notice of such determination.
21. Id. at 164, 168 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 180 (Douglas, J., concurring).
22. Id. at 185 (Jackson, J., concurring).
23. Id. at 187 (Reed, J., dissenting).
24. In Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952), the Court did not reach the due process
question, but seemed to indicate that labelling an individual disloyal would invoke due process
protections. Id. at 192. Ten years later, in Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961), the
Court apparently rejected the dictum in Wieman. In McElroy the Court denied due process
protections when an employee had been labelled a security risk at the naval installation where she
worked, thus being deprived of her job. Although the decision indicates that bestowing a badge of
infamy does not infringe on any constitutional right, it could be interpreted to mean only that the
governmental interest of maintaining high security protection outweighed the constitutional
interest in protecting one's good name. Most recently, in Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411
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Court decided Wisconsin v. Constantineau,25 a case involving a Wisconsin
statute 26 which permitted posting the names of certain individuals to prohibit
them from buying liquor. In striking down the statute for depriving an indi-
vidual of due process, the Court emphasized that the constitutional right
being protected was the individual's interest in his good name.27
Recognition of privacy as a fundamental right protected within the concept
of liberty in the fourteenth amendment was first introduced in Griswold v.
Connecticut.2 In Griswold Mr. Justice Douglas found justification for this
constitutionally protected right to privacy in the penumbras of the Bill of
Rights. 29 Five concurring Justices, however, did not feel bound by the con-
fines of the Bill of Rights." Rather, they found constitutional protection of a
zone of privacy on the basis of the fundamental fairness doctrine. 3' Eight
years later, in Roe v. Wade,32 the Court recognized a zone of privacy sur-
rounding one's personal autonomy. Relying on the fundamental fairness
scope of liberty as advocated by the five concurring Justices in Griswold, the
Court defined this new protection without explicit justification in the penum-
bras of the Bill of Rights.
Because the limitations of the zone of privacy protection were left uncer-
tain by these cases, many lower courts found a right of privacy surrounding
arrest records. Dissemination of arrest records as infringing on an individu-
al's right of privacy was first discussed in Menard v. Mitchell.33 The existence
of a constitutionally protected interest in an individual's arrest record was
recently acknowledged again in Menard v. Saxbe.34 Most recently, in Utz v.
Cullinane,35 the court recognized the serious constitutional questions raised
when the government disseminates records of arrests not culminating in
convictions. 36 Although it did not decide this constitutional issue, the court in
(1969), the Court again avoided reliance upon reputation alone as the interest being afforded due
process protections. Rather, the Court emphasized that due process protections were applicable
since the commission's findings would be used as evidence against the plaintiff in a court of law.
Thus, although this line of cases illustrates a reluctance by the Court to invoke due process
protection on the ground that one's reputation has been injured, the cases do not clearly rule that
an interest in one's good name is not constitutionally protected.
25. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
26. WIs. STAT. § 176.26 (1967).
27. 400 U.S. at 437.
28. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The Court held unconstitutional a Connecticut statute imposing
criminal sanctions on any person giving medical advice regarding contraceptives.
29. Id. at 484, 485.
30. See id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring); id. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 502
(White, J., concurring).
31. See notes 8-13 supra and accompanying text.
32. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roethe Court held unconstitutional the Texas abortion law which
imposed criminal sanctions for procuring an abortion for any purpose other than saving the life of
the mother.
33. 430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970). In Menardthe court reversed summary judgment based on
the theory that the established facts were inadequate for proper resolution of the issue of the
FBI's authority to maintain an individual's arrest records after the charges have been dismissed.
The court recognized that the extent to which the records were disseminated plays a large role in
determining how accurate those records must be. Id. at 492. Because the district court did not
consider this fact, the court of appeals remanded the case for trial. Id. at 495. By discussing the
different variables to determine if the court could order the FBI to expunge the appellant's arrest
record, the court impliedly recognized that the individual had a protected interest in those
records. In fact, the court argued that there could be no constitutional justification for mainte-
nance of appellant's file if the arrest was made without probable cause. Id. at 492.
34. 498 F.2d 1017, 1025 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In Saxbe the court held that the FBI had no
authority to retain plaintiff's arrest record once the encounter was established not to be an arrest.
35. 520 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
36. Id. at 482.
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Utz was convinced that the individual should be constitutionally protected in
such situations.3 7 The three previously mentioned cases were all decided in
the District of Columbia Circuit, and the Third Circuit has also concluded that
dissemination of police records invades an individual's constitutionally pro-
tected right of privacy.38 Although the Eighth Circuit has refused to impose a
burden upon the FBI to insure the accuracy of arrest reports disseminated by
local law enforcement authorities,3 9 the court has accepted the principle that
individuals have a constitutionally protected interest sufficient to require that
local law enforcement authorities expunge arrest records under certain
circumstances .4
III. PAUL V. DAVIS
The Supreme Court in Paul concluded that the interest in one's good name
is not a right protected within the scope of liberty under the fourteenth
amendment, and, therefore, is not entitled to due process protections.4 This
determination was based entirely on the examination of precedent.4 2 The
Court additionally found that the zones of personal privacy discussed in
Griswold and Roe did not protect an individual from government publication
of arrest records .43 The Court reasoned that publication of official acts did not
violate guarantees which were "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty."44 As a result of these findings, the plaintiff failed to show a
deprivation of a constitutional right, and, consequently, his action under the
civil rights statute 45 failed.'
The decision in Constantineau was a formidable barrier to the Court's
finding that harm to reputation would not invoke due process protections. In
Constantineau the Court found due process protections applicable where the
right being protected was the individual's interest in his good name. 47 The
Court in Paul interpreted the language in Constantineau to mean that due
process protections were invoked because of a denial of a right to buy liquor
and not because of harm to the individual's reputation. 48 The Court justified
37. Id. at 482 n.41.
38. See Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862, 868 (3d Cir. 1975). in which the court denied the
expungement of FBI records concerning the investigation of certain allegations which proved to
be false. The court recognized the plaintiff's constitutional interest in those files, but denied
expungement on the ground that insufficient evidence was established to outweigh the important
governmental interest in maintaining the records.
39. See Crow v. Kelley, 512 F.2d 752 (8th Cir. 1975).
40. Id. at 754.
41. 96 S. Ct. at 1166, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 420.
42. Id. at 1161,47 L. Ed. 2d at 414. The Court refused to consider if the interest in one's good
name was a fundamental right protected by the concept of liberty. This decision demonstrates the
Court's reluctance, since Roe, to recognize constitutional protections in the concept of liberty
unless justified in explicit clauses of the Bill of Rights. Id. at 1160, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 413, 414. This
trend is contrary to what had been the accepted scope of liberty. See notes 8-11 supra and
accompanying text.
43. Id. at 1166, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 420, 421.
44. Id.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
46. In order for plaintiff's complaint to have been cognizable under § 1983 he must have
alleged both a deprivation of a constitutional right and the effectuation of that deprivation under
color of law. See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970). The Court assumed
that the action taken by defendants which allegedly deprived plaintiff of constitutional rights was
achieved under color of law. See 96 S. Ct. at 1158 n.2, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 411 n.2.
47. See notes 24-27 supra and accompanying text.




this interpretation by reasoning that the authority cited in Constantineau did
not support a decision finding a protected interest in one's good name.4 9 The
Court further reasoned that Board of Regents v. Roth0 supported this
interpretation since that decision recognized that the range of interests pro-
tected by procedural due process was not infinite. 5'
The dissent raised two major objections to the majority's disposition of the
case. First, the dissent, claiming that the decision is inconsistent with the
relevant case law, relied heavily upon Jenkins v. McKeithen5 2 in arguing for
constitutional protection of one's good name. In Jenkins, however, it was the
fact that the commission's findings could be used as evidence against the
individual in court that invoked due process protections and not the harm to
the reputation of the individual.53 The dissent also emphasized the Constan-
tineau decision as establishing a constitutional protection in one's good name,
arguing that the Court in Constantineau did not find due process protections
on the grounds that Constantineau was deprived of a right to buy liquor.
Rather it was argued that the "label" given a person posted under the
Wisconsin statute invoked due process protections. The dissent's interpreta-
tion of Constantineau provides the fairer interpretation of that case.54
Second, the dissent disputed the majority's failure to consider the funda-
mental nature of the right being deprived, and noted that "liberty" under the
fourteenth amendment encompasses rights beyond those found explicitly
within the Bill of Rights.55 By pointing out the frightening consequences the
majority's decision may produce,56 the dissent implicitly advocated that the
interest in one's good name must be a fundamental right, protected within the
scope of liberty, irrespective of explicit justification within the text of the Bill
of Rights. 57 Furthermore, the dissent argued that the majority decision would
allow the states to impose punishment through criminal labelling without
affording the accused safeguards preserved within the Bill of Rights.58 The
dissent correctly contends that state actions achieving such results should be
prevented, at the very least, by the penumbras of the Bill of Rights consistent
49. Id. The Court interpreted the authority cited in Constantineau as holding that due
process protections would only be invoked when the harm to one's reputation was coupled with
loss of some more tangilbe interest such as the denial of employment.
50. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). In Roth the Court held that the plaintiff, an assistant professor at
Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh, was not entitled to a due process hearing since the
university's decision not to rehire the non-tenured professor did not seriously damage his good
name.
51. Id. at 570.
52. 395 U.S. 411 (1969). In Jenkins the constitutionality of a Louisiana statute permitting the
Labor-Management Commission of Inquiry to collect evidence and determine guilt of individuals
without affording due process protections was challenged.
53. Id. at 427, 428.
54. The majority's interpretation of Constantineau depends solely upon its interpretation of
authority there cited. See note 49 supra and accompanying text. The case law cited as authority in
Constantineau is not as repugnant to the dissent's interpretation of Constantineauas the majority
indicates in its opinion. See notes 20-24 supra and accompanying text. Furthermore, subsequent
applications of Constantineau consistently reject the analysis applied by the majority. See, e.g.,
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972); Lake Mich. College Fed'n of Teachers v.
Lake Mich. Community College, 518 F.2d 1091, 1096 (6th Cir. 1975); Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d
1017, 1024 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Urban v. Breier, 401 F. Supp. 706 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
55. See notes 9, 10 supra and accompanying text.
56. See96S. Ct. at 1170n.9,1172n.12,1176n.17,47L. Ed. 2dat426n.9,428 n.12,433 n.17.
57. Id. at 1171 n.10, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 428 n.10.
58. Id. at 1172, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 427, 428.
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with the Court's ruling in Griswold. It is difficult, however, to challenge a
finding determinative upon the "fundamental" nature of the interest. This
decision illustrates that reliance upon vague tests, such as the fundamental
fairness doctrine, to determine the scope of constitutional rights may limit
protections as easily as they were extended in Griswold and Roe.
The second issue raised in Paul concerned the scope of the zone of privacy
protections raised in Roe and Griswold.59 The Court ruled that the plaintiff
was not deprived of his right of privacy by the publication of his arrest
record.6 The Court emphasized that there could be no right of privacy in
official acts of public record, making this determination without discussion of
the case law which had developed in the lower federal courts recognizing right
of privacy in similar situations.61 The decision will likely alter established
authority in this area. 62
IV. CONCLUSION
The holding in Paul v. Davis denies an individual due process protection
where the damages suffered by that individual are limited to harm to his
reputation, unless some more tangible interest is involved. This holding is
premised upon the assumption that interest in one's good name is neither
"liberty" nor "property" within the due process clause, and remains applic-
able regardless of any governmental justification for its actions. 63 Throughout
the opinion the Supreme Court assumes that harm to one's reputation is not
such a significant harm as to be accorded constitutional protection. This
assumption is made despite the recognition given by lower federal courts that
the repercussions of being labelled an arrestee are significant. 64 Finally, the
Court, almost as an afterthought, summarily dismissed the contention that the
plaintiff had a constitutionally protected right of privacy concerning the
publication of his arrest record. The effect of this arbitrary decision is to
defeat the constitutional protections afforded the criminal by due process of
law. An individual may now be labelled a criminal, thus inflicting significant
punishment upon him, without providing him with those protections which
are thought to be the very essence of democratic government.
Marc S. Culp
59. Although the dissent did not reach this issue, it characterized the majority's decision on
this point as dictum since the lower court did not address the privacy claims and since the issue
had been inadequately briefed by the parties. Id. at 1177 n.18, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 434 n.18.
60. The flyer stated that those men listed had been arrested during 1971 and 1972. Id. at 1158,
47 L. Ed. 2d at 410.
61. See notes 33-40 supra and accompanying text.
62. This decision brings into question part of the holding of the Texas court of civil appeals in
Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Houston, 531 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.), noted in 30 Sw. L.J. 514 (1976). In that case the court held that the
constitutional right of the press and public to information should not include access to personal
history and arrest records. Id. at 188. The court reasoned that the individual's right to privacy
protected by the United States Constitution outweighed the media's need for background
information. Id. Given that the Court in Davis found no constitutional right of privacy regarding
arrest records, there is no longer the need to balance an individual's interest against the media's
constitutional right of access to information concerning crime. Accordingly, the media's right of
access to information concerning crime will also include access to the personal history and the
arrest records of individuals.
63. Because the court rejects the notion that one's good name is a constitutionally protected
right, no balancing of interests is necessary. SeeBoard of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,570, 571
(1972).
64. See, e.g., Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 490 n.17, 491 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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